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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT 
COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF 
PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. No. 2-12-cr-00183-001) 
District Judge: Hon. Terrence F. McVerry 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 11, 2014 
______________ 
 
Before: CHAGARES, SHWARTZ, and ALDISERT, Circuit 
Judges. 
 
(Filed: February 26, 2014) 
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1500 Liberty Center 
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Michael Leo Ivory, Esq. 
Rebecca R. Haywood, Esq. 
United States Attorney’s Office 
700 Grant Street, Suite 4000 
Pittsburgh, PA 15219 
 
 Counsel for Appellee 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Antoine Cortez-Dutrieville (“Dutrieville”) appeals the 
denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized from the 
home of the mother of his child.  The District Court denied 
the motion, holding that Dutrieville was prohibited from 
entering the home as a result of a protection order and thus 
lacked standing to challenge the search.  We will affirm. 
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I 
 
 On June 8, 2012, United States Customs and Border 
Protection officers at John F. Kennedy International Airport 
intercepted a UPS package containing heroin.  The mailing 
address handwritten on the package was “Mrs. APARNA 
BEENA, NO. 18 Walnut St. Union Town PA 15401.”  App. 
210.  The electronic manifest indicated that the address was 
“59 Millview Dr. Uniontown, PA 15401.”  App. 211-12.  
When the handwritten address and the electronic address 
conflict, UPS delivers the package to the electronic address. 
 
 Law enforcement agents repackaged the heroin in a 
new box.  The new box listed the Millview address instead of 
the Walnut address and contained a beeper that would 
indicate when the package was opened.  On this information, 
the agents obtained an anticipatory search warrant for the 
Millview address, the residence of Portia Newell, the mother 
of Dutrieville’s child.  The warrant extended to the contents 
of the package and a list of materials commonly associated 
with drug trafficking.  The search warrant was to be executed 
once the package was accepted and taken inside the home.  
 
 On June 13, 2012, an undercover agent delivered the 
package to Dutrieville.  Two minutes later the beeper 
activated.  Agents approached the home, announced their 
presence, and, after receiving no response, entered the home.  
They took Dutrieville into custody and searched the home.  
 
 In the rear bedroom, agents found the heroin 
underneath a blanket.  In the master bedroom, they found the 
empty package, the beeper, Dutrieville’s cell phone, and 
Dutrieville’s overnight bag, which contained personal items 
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and 45 unused stamp bags (which are often used to package 
heroin).  The agents also found digital scales and other drug 
paraphernalia in the living room.    
 
 Dutrieville eventually admitted that he had been 
staying at the home with Newell’s consent for three days.  
The District Court found that Dutrieville brought his 
overnight bag with him at the inception of his stay.  He also 
admitted that he was the subject of a Protection From Abuse 
Order (the “protection order”), which provided, among other 
things, that: (1) Dutrieville was not to contact Newell except 
to make child custody arrangements; (2) Dutrieville was 
“completely evicted and excluded from” Newell’s residence; 
(3) Dutrieville had “no right or privilege to enter or be present 
on the premises of [Newell]”; (4) the protection order would 
remain in effect until October 7, 2013; (5) Newell’s consent 
could not override the express terms of the order; and (6) 
Dutrieville could be arrested without a warrant for violating 
the terms of the order.  App. 194-96. 
 
 Dutrieville was charged with one count of attempted 
possession with intent to distribute 100 grams or more of a 
mixture or a substance containing a detectable amount of 
heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).  
 
 Dutrieville filed a motion to suppress the evidence 
obtained during the search, arguing that the anticipatory 
search warrant was not supported by probable cause.  
Specifically, he argued that the agents manufactured probable 
cause by changing the address on the label from the Walnut 
address to the Millview address.  The District Court held that 
Dutrieville did not have Fourth Amendment standing to bring 
this challenge since he was subject to a protection order that 
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barred him from the home, and thus he lacked a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in both the home and the overnight 
bag. Dutrieville entered a conditional guilty plea which 
allowed him to file an appeal of the suppression ruling.  On 
appeal, he asserts that he has Fourth Amendment standing 
and that this Court should remand the case to the District 
Court for consideration of his probable cause argument. 
 
II 
 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3231.  We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.  We review a District Court’s denial of a 
motion to suppress for clear error as to the underlying facts, 
but exercise plenary review of the application of the law to 
the facts.  United States v. Lockett, 406 F.3d 207, 211 (3d 
Cir. 2005).  Dutrieville bears the burden of establishing a 
violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.  United States v. 
Stearn, 597 F.3d 540, 551 (3d Cir. 2010).   
 
III 
 
 “A defendant must have standing to invoke the Fourth 
Amendment’s exclusionary rule.”  United States v. Correa, 
653 F.3d 187, 190 (3d Cir. 2011).  A defendant has standing 
if he can establish that he had a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in the invaded place.  Id.; see also United States v. 
Mosley, 454 F.3d 249, 253 n.5 (3d Cir. 2006) (“The 
‘standing’ inquiry, in the Fourth Amendment context, is 
shorthand for the determination of whether a litigant’s Fourth 
Amendment rights have been implicated.”).  An individual’s 
expectation of privacy is legitimate if: (1) the individual 
demonstrated a subjective expectation of privacy in the 
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subject of the search and (2) this expectation of privacy is 
objectively reasonable.  See United States v. Kennedy, 638 
F.3d 159, 163 (3d Cir. 2011).  The subjective prong requires a 
court to determine whether the defendant, “by his conduct, 
has exhibited an actual expectation of privacy.”  Bond v. 
United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338 (2000) (citation omitted).  
The objective prong requires a court to determine whether the 
defendant’s “expectation of privacy is ‘one that society is 
prepared to recognize as reasonable.’”  Correa, 653 F.3d at 
190 (quoting Bond, 529 U.S. at 338).   
 
 The question here is whether Dutrieville had an 
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the home and 
his overnight bag.
1
   
 
A 
 
 Dutrieville argues that he had an objectively 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the home since he was 
an overnight guest staying at the home with Newell’s consent.  
Generally, a person’s “status as an overnight guest is alone 
enough to show that he had an expectation of privacy in the 
home that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.”  
Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 96-97 (1990).    This is 
because a guest typically “seeks shelter in another’s home 
precisely because it provides him with privacy, a place where 
he and his possessions will not be disturbed by anyone but his 
host and those his host allows inside.”  Id. at 99.  Moreover, 
                                              
 
1
 Because Dutrieville lacked an objectively reasonable 
expectation of privacy in both the home and the bag, we need 
not consider the subjective prong.  Correa, 653 F.3d at 190 
n.3. 
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“hosts will more likely than not respect the privacy interests 
of their guests.”  Id.  Accordingly, acknowledging “that an 
overnight guest has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his 
host’s home merely recognizes the everyday expectations of 
privacy that we all share.”   Id. at 98. 
 
 Though most overnight guests have an objectively 
reasonable expectation of privacy, Dutrieville was not like 
most overnight guests.  The key distinction is that the 
protection order prohibited Dutrieville from entering the 
home and from having any contact with Newell.  Pursuant to 
Pennsylvania law, Dutrieville’s mere presence in the home 
violated the order and exposed him to criminal liability.  See 
23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6114(a).
2
  Importantly, Newell’s consent 
could not override the terms of the protection order.  
Consequently, like a trespasser,
3
 a squatter,
4
 or any individual 
                                              
 
2
 As Dutrieville notes, Pennsylvania courts have held 
that a de minimis violation of a protection order may not be 
sufficient to support a conviction for criminal contempt.  See 
Commonwealth v. Haigh, 874 A.2d 1174, 1177-78 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2005).  Here, Dutrieville admitted that he had been 
staying in the home for three days in violation of the order.  
This level of violation exceeds the level that Pennsylvania 
courts have found to be de minimis. See id. (holding that a 
defendant’s violation was de minimis when he briefly asked 
his wife about a health problem during a court proceeding).  
 
3
 United States v. Struckman, 603 F.3d 731, 747 (9th 
Cir. 2010) (noting that trespassers lack Fourth Amendment 
standing). 
 
4
 Amezquita v. Hernandez-Colon, 518 F.2d 8, 11 (1st 
Cir. 1975) (holding that squatters on government land lack 
Fourth Amendment standing). 
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who “occup[ies] a piece of property unlawfully,”5 
Dutrieville’s presence in the home was “wrongful,” and 
therefore any expectation of privacy he may have had was not 
one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.  See 
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978).
6
    
 
B 
 
 Dutrieville also argues that, even if he lacked a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in the home, he had one in 
his overnight bag.  First, according to Dutrieville, the 
protection order did not extend to any of his belongings, and, 
therefore, while his presence in the home may have been 
unlawful despite Newell’s consent, his bag’s presence was 
not.  Second, he attempts to analogize his case to cases 
holding that an individual retains a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in bags kept with a third party.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Waller, 426 F.3d 838, 844-45 (6th Cir. 2005) 
(holding that defendant had a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in luggage stored at friend’s residence); United States 
v. Salinas-Cano, 959 F.2d 861, 864 (10th Cir. 1992) (noting 
that overnight bags “historically command a high degree of 
privacy”); United States v. Most, 876 F.2d 191, 197-98 (D.C. 
                                              
 
5
 United States v. Curlin, 638 F.3d 562, 565 (7th Cir. 
2011) (collecting cases). 
 
6
 Our holding is consistent with the holdings of other 
courts to address the Fourth Amendment rights of an 
individual violating a protection order.  See Washington v. St. 
Albans Police Dep’t, 30 F. Supp. 2d 455, 457-58 (D. Vt. 
1998); Commonwealth v. Morrison, 710 N.E.2d 584, 586 
(Mass. 1999); State v. Stephenson, 760 N.W.2d 22, 26-27 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2009). 
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Cir. 1989) (holding that defendant had a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in a bag entrusted to store clerks). 
 
 These arguments are unavailing.  The standing 
question turns on whether his expectation of privacy was 
objectively reasonable.  Correa, 653 F.3d at 190.  Because 
Dutrieville’s mere presence in the home was unlawful, it 
follows that he lacked an objectively reasonable expectation 
of privacy in a bag that he brought with him during an 
unlawful visit.  This is because a person legally prohibited 
from entering a particular place cannot reasonably expect to 
use that place as a “private repository for his personal 
effects.”  United States v. Wellons, 32 F.3d 117, 119 (4th Cir. 
1994) (internal quotation marks omitted).  After all, if his 
personal effects are stored at the prohibited place, he cannot 
lawfully access them and therefore cannot reasonably expect 
that he will be able to exercise control over them or that they 
“will remain undisturbed.”  See United States v. Jackson, 585 
F.2d 653, 658 (4th Cir. 1978) (noting that a trespasser on 
another’s property or an individual on abandoned property 
lacks an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
personal effects stored there); see also United States v. Baker, 
221 F.3d 438, 442 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding, in a case 
concerning a person’s Fourth Amendment rights in a 
borrowed car, that standing depends on “the strength of [a 
person’s] interest” in the searched property and “the nature of 
his control over it”). 
 
 Unlike the cases he cites, Dutrieville asserts a privacy 
interest located in a place he is legally prohibited from 
entering.  Dutrieville was prohibited from entering the home 
when he brought the bag and was also prohibited from 
accessing the bag while it was in the home.  Accordingly, he 
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lacked an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
bag. 
 
IV 
 
 For these reasons, Dutrieville lacks standing to 
challenge the search of the home and his overnight bag.  We 
will therefore affirm the District Court’s order denying his 
motion to suppress. 
